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Abstract
Religious participation is much more widespread in the United
States than in Europe, while Europeans tend to view sects more suspi-
ciously than Americans. We propose an explanation for these patterns
without assuming diﬀerences in preferences or market fundamentals.
Religious markets may have multiple equilibria, suggesting that ob-
served diﬀerences in religious structures may merely be eventualities.
Further, equilibria with more sects result in higher welfare and lower
membership costs, as secular societies tend to host on average more
demanding sects. Our main methodological contribution to the the-
ory of religious markets is endogenizing simultaneously supply and
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11 Introduction
Religious attitudes and participation diﬀer largely between the United States
and Europe. In the United States, more than 40 percent of population at-
tend church weekly and religious participation has increased steadily over
the last two hundred years. Europe is much more secular: In Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden, less than 10 percent of population attend church
weekly, in the United Kingdom around 15 percent, and in Germany 16 per-
cent (Iannaccone (1998); Bruce (1999); GESIS (2004)).
Also political attitudes and public opinion towards the necessity or desir-
ability of policing religious groups tend to diﬀer largely between Europe and
the United States (Kent (2001)). In general, Europeans have a more cautious
attitude towards new religious groups while Americans place a much higher
value on religious laissez-faire. E.g., a recent report by a German govern-
mental Enquete Commission (1998) on religious groups and psycho-groups
actively calls for regulation and surveillance of sects and cults — which is
regarded by politicians in the United States as an infringement of religious
rights.1 On the contrary, many European politicians dismiss the lenient
American attitude as ignorant and defend their interventions on the grounds
of protecting potential sect victims.2
So far, the economic theory of religion has not provided an entirely con-
vincing explanation for the large diﬀerences in religious participation and
attitudes towards non-mainstream religious groups. The dominant strand of
the theory of religious markets, the so-called supply-side theory, views the
demand for religion as largely invariant across time and space such that dif-
ferences in religious patterns must be attributed to diﬀerences on the supply
sides of religious markets (Stark and Bainbridge (1996)). Supply-side theory
argues that religious markets in Europe are dominated by “lazy” monopoly
churches without entrepreneurial zeal while the United States hosts large
numbers of competitive sects and religious groups that actively vie for devo-
tees. Openness and competitive pressures in American religious markets
1E.g., the United States Department of State writes: “Several [German] states have
published pamphlets detailing the ideology and practices of nonmainstream religions.
States defend the practice by noting their responsibility to respond to citizens’ requests for
information about these groups. While many of the pamphlets are factual and relatively
unbiased, others may harm the reputations of some groups through innuendo and inclu-
sion in a report covering known dangerous cults or movements” (International Religious
Freedom Report 2002, p. 3).
2E.g., the chairman of a French ministerial mission to combat the inﬂuence of cults,
Alain Vivien, declared: “No one can forbid us to take action against sects in the interests
of human rights. This point of view is particularly absurd when these movements ﬂout
the most elementary rights” (The Guardian, June 14, 2000).
2serve the needs of religious customers better and thereby generate higher
participation and consumer satisfaction than drowsy religious dinosaurs in
Europe.3 While quite persuasive, the current version of supply-side theory
is not able to resolve a number of intriguing puzzles in religious markets.
E.g., it cannot explain why more fervent sects do not overtake “monopoly
churches” in Western Europe where religious competition has been free for
at least several decades. Furthermore, supply-side theory has trouble with
explaining why there are also vast diﬀerences in religious market structures
across the United States — although the same openness and rights of religious
freedom apply in all states (also see Bruce (1999) on that point). Finally,
supply-side theory cannot (and, to be fair, does not try to) explain why at-
titudes towards the regulation of religious markets diﬀer so largely across
countries that are equally strict in their laïzism or their separation of church
and state like the United States and France.4
In this paper, we propose a formal model of a religious market from which
a possible explanation for these phenomena emerges. In that model, both
demand and supply are endogenous: Customers (i.e., potential members of
religious groups) have religious wants. Entrepreneurs in the religious market
incur some costs in establishing spiritual services and, in return, demand for
compensation that depends on their personal characteristics.5 More charis-
matic leaders are able to collect larger tithes, giving them a comparative ad-
vantage in establishing a sect.6 Unlike many contributions to the economics
3Studies by Iannaccone (1991), Stark and Iannaccone (1994), Stark et al. (1995), and
Iannaccone (1998) corroborate a positive correlation between rates of religious diversity
and religious participation. Voas et al. (2002) and Bruce (1999) dismiss these observations
as a mere statistical artefact.
4According to Chaves and Cann (1992) and Messner (1999), the United States, Canada,
Australia, France, the Netherlands and, surprisingly, Ireland are the Western countries
where religion is most deregulated and church-state separation is strictest.
5Viewing religious groups as driven by monetary incentives dates at least back to Adam
Smith (1999[1776], pp. 376f). Empirical evidence ranges from the medieval Catholic church
to U.S. “televangelist” Jim Bakker who diverted money collected from his followers to pay
for private luxuries, including an air-conditioned dog-kennel. See Iannaccone (1998, pp.
1484f) for a brief survey on entrepreneurial models of religious groups.
6Whether the question is of a congregation belonging to a larger denomination, a
church, a sect or a cult, we refer to those groups simply as “sects”, and we use the word
in a neutral sense. In general, the use of the word “sect” is multifarious. In a theological
m e a n i n ga“ s e c t ”r e f e r st oag r o u pw h i c hf o l l o w sdogmas or religious practices that deviate,
or have been declared to deviate, from established or oﬃcial doctrines; with the fading
of faith monopolies this distinction has, however, become more or less vacuous. The
social sciences deﬁne a sect as a small, exclusive, mostly religious or ideological group that
demands substantial commitment of its followers and which places special emphasis on the
group’s otherness from its environment (Abercrombie et al. (2000), pp. 371f). European
colloquial use of language often adds to this the degradation and bonding of individuals
3of religion (e.g., the seminal contribution by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975)),
our paper focuses on life on earth, without taking a stance on the existence
of afterlife. The perceived potential beneﬁts in afterlife are taken as a given
intrinsic motivation for sect membership.
Our analysis suggests that equilibria in religious market are generally not
unique. In particular, both a “secular” (European-type) equilibrium — char-
acterized by a small number of small sects with highly charismatic leaders
demanding large tithes of their ﬂock and an otherwise low religious participa-
tion — and a “sectarian” (American-type) equilibrium — where a substantial
part of the population is distributed over a large number of on average rather
low-demanding sects — might emerge. More generally, the same set of ini-
tial conditions (represented by distributions over consumer preferences and
the characteristics of the suppliers of religious services) might give rise to
largely diﬀerent outcomes with respect to the religious participation in the
population, the number of active religious groups in the market, the extent
of their activities, and their membership costs. This observation lends to a
new “explanation” for observed diversity in religious patterns: that of a mere
eventuality or, for believers, an act of Providence.
As a corollary, cross-country diﬀerences in religious market equilibria need
not be due to diﬀerences in supply or demand conditions, diﬀerent institu-
tional settings, diﬀerences in the populations’ spiritual neediness or suscep-
tibility to religious marketing etc.; they simply could be more or less random
equilibrium realizations in a market game with indeterminate outcome. In
particular, this might have occurred in the United States where one ﬁnds a
puzzling (and growing) religious diversity across the states. Although the
same constitutionally guaranteed rules for freedom of religion apply all over
the nation (i.e., the religious market is “competitive” everywhere), the states
exhibit large variations in observed religious structures.7 Moreover, Bruce
(1999, Chs. 3 and 4) lists plenty of observations, both historical and recent,
from the United States and Europe, that the supply siders’ prediction of a
o rt h ep r e a c h i n go fi n t o l e r a n c e—ap e r s p e c t i v et h a tw ed on o te n d o r s eh e r e .
7In few states there is a dominant denomination (Utah with 71 percent Latter Day
Saints, Rhode Island with 63 percent Catholics) while the largest denomination in West
Virginia, the United Methodist Church, covers a mere 10 percent of the population (ad-
herents.com (2003)). In Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Wyoming, 20 percent or more of
population have no religion, constituting the largests “religious” group. In North Dakota,
Alabama, and Mississippi, only seven percent or less have no religion (ARIS (2001)).
Counting only for major religious groups (in which at least 0.5 percent of the populace
assemble), there are more than 20 such groups in Oregon while North Dakota and New
Hampshire only host twelve (ARIS (2001)). Both in Oregon and Vermont, around 21 per-
cent of the population do not adhere to any religion; Vermont is, however, largely catholic
(38 percent) while Oregon’s population is split over numerous denominations.
4positive association between pluralism and religious vitality is questionable.
While Bruce (1999) uses these observations to dismiss the rational-choice
model of religion as patently ﬂawed, our formalization of religious markets
with multiple equilibria suggests that the rational-choice approach is well-
suited to derive a manifold of empirically relevant predictions, and therefore
ought to be reﬁned, rather than dismissed, as a tool for analyzing religion.8
A further implication of our model is that the smaller is the number of
sects that are active in a market equilibrium the higher are the demands
which these sects impose on their (relatively few) members.9 I.e., in more
secular societies sects impose, on average, heavier burdens on their small
ﬂock than in societies with higher rates of religious participation. Hence,
fears that sect leaders might “abusively” extract signiﬁcant resources from
their members would then seem, on average, more justiﬁed in a secular than
in a sectarian equilibrium. Diﬀerent religious equilibria might therefore also
frame the perception of sects and, as a consequence, policy attitudes towards
religious groups.
It should be noted, however, that our model does not provide any support
for a policy of limiting competition in the religious market. Rather to the
contrary, we show that, if there are multiple equilibria, the one with the
largest number of active sects is the optimal one from a welfare perspective.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a stylized
model of a religious market. Consumers decide on sect membership in a
utility-maximizing manner, and sect leaders, whose charismatic qualities are
unknown to consumers upon entrance into the sect, strive for proﬁtm a x i -
mization. As shown in Section 3, market equilibria in this model are not
necessarily unique. However, in Section 4 we show that under certain condi-
tions equilibria can be ranked in terms of social welfare. Section 5 summarizes
our ﬁndings and concludes.
2 A Model of Religious Markets
There is a continuum of potential sect leaders who can oﬀer religious services
to their customers. If a potential sect leader establishes a sect, he or she
8Our results are complementary with a recent contribution by Barros and Garoupa
(2002). They introduce spatial—location models into the economics of religion, taking
entry decisions as given.
9In this paper, we only consider contributions in the form of tithes. Apart from asking
for money, religious groups can and do require a lot of their members also along other
dimensions (Iannaccone (1992b), Berman (2000)). They impose signiﬁcant costs in terms
of sacriﬁce, abstinence from certain reprehensible pleasures, strict morality and even stigma
upon their members and, in the extreme, may even drive them to martyrdom.
5has to incur a ﬁxed entry cost d, consisting of the costs of fabricating a
doctrine, using time to convince members of it, and opening a church or
temple. The entry cost is net of any psychological or spiritual satisfaction
that a sect founder might gain from establishing a sect. We therefore need
not model religious motivations of sect leaders explicitly. They operate as
proﬁt maximizers and earn their revenues by charging contributions from
their members, but only long after having attracted them to their sect.
Sect leaders diﬀer in their “charisma” which we use as a generic term
for all attributes of a sect leader that make membership in his or her sect
attractive for potential targets: personal charm, negotiating skills, telegenic
appearance, sermonic fervor, and convincingness. Charisma determines how
much the sect leader can request from sect members. Unlike for other social
groups, the ability of sect leaders to charge contributions from members does
not derive from a binding contract, signed upon entrance into the sect, but
from associating exit or expulsion from the sect with certain religious or
social costs (after-life punishment, loss of the social network etc.) that sect
members wish to avoid. For believers, a threat of afterlife punishment is
credible; individuals unwilling to adhere to the sect’s rules and discipline risk
the wrath of God, damnation, or other heavenly sanctions.10
For sake of simplicity, we set exit costs from a sect to be equal in value to
charisma c. At the time of establishing the sect and of attracting members,
charisma of sect leaders is their private knowledge. The charisma of potential
sect leaders is distributed with continuous density f(c) over a closed interval
[0,c].B yF(c) we denote the attending cumulative distribution function.
There is a continuum of consumers who might be interested in joining a
sect. Denote by h the willingness to pay for the religious beneﬁts and services
associated with becoming a sect member and assume that h is distributed
across the population with density g(h) and support [h,¯ h]. Correspondingly,
denote by G(h): =
R h
h g(ξ)dξ the cumulative distribution function of h.W i t h -
out loss of generality, we assume that the mass of potential members and of
potential leaders both are equal to one.
The sequence of events unfolds as follows: First, sect leaders, who have
private, but non-veriﬁable information about their charisma decide on whether
to establish a sect. Consumers then decide whether or not to join a sect. By
experience, those who joined learn the charisma of their sect leaders, each of
whom then asks his or her members for contribution (tithes). Sect members
10It is well-known from “Pascal’s Wager” (Pascal 1995[1660], § 233) that such a threat
need not be trustworthy with probability one, but will make members of religious groups
obey to the obligations of the sect even if only a positive probability is attached to a
suﬃciently high loss in the post-mortal quality of life.
6then choose whether to pay what is asked or to exit the sect, incurring a
psychological exit cost.
The utility u of type-h consumer if (s)he enters a sect whose leader has
charisma c is given by
u =
½
h − t(c) if he stays in the sect and pays tithes
h − x(c) if he leaves the sect, (1)
where t and x denote tithes and exit costs, respectively.
In (1) we assume that the religious gross beneﬁts of sect membership (es-
tablishing a relationship to God, obtaining ethical guidelines, being baptized
etc.) are irredeemable, i.e., they would not be lost upon exit from the sect.
Religious net beneﬁts in case of leaving the sect may diﬀer, as a charismatic
sect leader may convince sect members of after-life punishment in case they
leave (also see footnote 11 below). This also reﬂects the typical time pat-
tern of sect membership: ﬁrst members receive services without paying and
become absorbed, and only after that they are asked to pay.
In (1) it is further assumed that neither tithes nor exit costs diﬀer across
individuals. The ﬁrst assumption can be justiﬁed by the inability of sects to
eﬀectively diﬀerentiate the contributions they levy according to their mem-
bers’ individual willingnesses to pay, which is private information. The sec-
ond assumption is made for simplicity. If the willingness to pay for sect mem-
bership depended on individual-speciﬁcr a n d o mv a r i a b l ea n ds e c tl e a d e r ’ s
charisma, then sect leaders would choose the tithe they ask to maximize ex-
pected payments from their members, taking into account that this may lead
into exit by those with lowest willingness to pay.
We assume that exit costs x are strictly increasingly related to the charisma
level of the sect leader. For simplicity, but without any loss of generality we
will henceforth assume that exit costs are (numerically) equal to the charisma
level of the sect leaders from whose sect the members exit: x(c)=c.I na n
equilibrium, a proﬁt-maximizing sect leader will then demand contributions
equal to what would be his members’ exit cost, i.e., contributions (numeri-
cally) equal charisma: t(c)=x(c)=c. This also ensures that no sect member
will ever leave a sect.11
Upon entrance into a sect, charisma levels of sect leaders are still un-
known to potential sect members. Hence, membership decisions are based
11 We could straightforwardly add to our model beneﬁts from sect membership that
positively depend on the charisma of the sect leader and that would be foregone upon exit
from the sect. Denoting such beneﬁts by b(c), individual h’s utility (1) from becoming and
staying a sect member would then be h + b(c) − t(c), while the decision to ﬁrst join and
later leave a sect would yield h − x(c).P r o ﬁt maximizing sect leaders then would never
charge their sect members in excess of t(c)=x(c)+b(c) which is strictly increasing in c
and would, therefore, result in an equivalent speciﬁcation of our model.
7on expectations about membership and exit costs (taking into account, of
course, that these are related one-to-one to charisma levels). Denoting by C
the expected charisma level in the religious market and employing the rea-
soning just outlined, consumer h expects his or her utility (1) from joining a
sect to be equal to
U(h): =E[u(h)] = h − C,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of charisma
levels for active sects. Observe that while each individual consumer treats C
as exogenous, it is endogenous on the level of economy. Normalizing every-
body’s utility when staying outside any sect to zero, individual h will join a
sect whenever U(h) ≥ 0. If individual h joins a sect, so will all individuals of
types h0 >h(at a given level of C). As charisma of diﬀerent sect leaders is
still private knowledge, those wishing to enter a sect are equally distributed
amongst all sects.
The expected costs of sect membership are determined by the lower bound
of charisma in the religious market:
C(ˆ c)=E(c|c ≥ ˆ c)=
1




Here, ˆ c denotes the level of charisma above which establishing a sect pays oﬀ
for the sect leader. With this charisma level, a sect leader makes zero proﬁt.
Proﬁts for a sect leader with charisma c,a m o u n tt o
n
1 − F(ˆ c)
· c − d





Denoting by ˆ h the marginal individual to join a sect, equilibrium in the
religious market is thus characterized by a pair (ˆ c,ˆ h) satisfying
α(ˆ h,ˆ c): =ˆ h −
1





β(ˆ h,ˆ c): =
ˆ c






1 − G(ˆ h)
1 − F(ˆ c)
· ˆ c − d =0 . (4)
8The ﬁrst condition is the zero-utility constraint for the marginal sect mem-
ber, requiring that expected membership costs equal the willingness-to-pay
for membership. The second condition is the break-even condition for the
marginal sect leader, requiring that the costs d for setting up the doctrine
equal the sect leader’s revenues. Revenues are calculated as (average) sect
size (1 − G(b h))/(1 − F(b c)) times the membership fee b c.
3 Existence and Multiplicity of Equilibria
O b s e r v et h a tb o t hl o c iα =0and β =0describe upward-sloped graphs in
the (ˆ h,ˆ c)-space. Namely:
dˆ c
dˆ h








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
β=0
=
g(ˆ h) · ˆ c · (1 − F(ˆ c))
(1 − G(ˆ h)) · (1 − F(ˆ c)+ˆ cf(ˆ c))
> 0
The sign of the ﬁrst expression comes from the fact that expected membership
costs are higher, the higher are charismatic requirements for sect leaders to




1 − F(ˆ c)
· [C(ˆ c) − ˆ c] > 0. (5)
Intuitively, it makes sense that both curves are upward-sloped: The threshold
willingness to pay of consumers in order to join a sect rises with the expected
membership costs which themselves increase in charisma level (hence, the α-
locus is upward-sloped). On the other hand, the threshold level for sect
leaders to enter into the religious market decreases with market size (since
all costs are ﬁxed costs) which itself is smaller the fewer customers join a sect
(hence, the β-locus is also upward-sloped).
As a result, neither non-existence nor multiplicity of equilibria can be
ruled out. If equilibria are not unique, they can be ranked in that a higher
charisma threshold always goes along with a higher willingness-to-pay thresh-
old. Recalling that 1 − F(ˆ c) is the number of sects in the market and that
1 − G(ˆ h) is the share of population that joins a sect, we can, thus, explain
• equilibria with a lot of sects, a high rate of sect membership in the
population and rather low expected membership costs (as also low-
proﬁle sect leaders with low charisma enter the market); and
9• equilibria with a small number of sects, a low rate of membership but
rather high expected membership costs (as only high-proﬁle sect leaders
enter the market).
We call the former type of equilibria sectarian and the latter type secular.
While general results on existence or multiplicity of equilibria are not
available, we can, however, exemplify the multitude of outcomes our simple
model is able to generate by assuming that the distributions of charisma
across sect leaders and of consumer types are both uniform. I.e., we assume
that variable h be uniformly distributed over an interval [a,b] ⊂ R with
b>a . We further assume that c is uniformly distributed on [0,1] which is








b − 1+ˆ c
2
b − a
and hence (3) and (4) read as









1 − ˆ c
− d =0 . (7)
We ﬁrst will show that equilibria in religious markets may well fail to
exist at all. Consider, e.g., the special case b =1where solving α = β =0
in (6) and (7) requires
ˆ c =2 d(1 − a).
Since c is restricted to [0,1], an equilibrium will thus fail to exist when the
ﬁxed cost d of setting up a sect are too high or the minimum willingness to
pay for sect membership (i.e., a) is too small.
Next, we investigate into the number of equilibria (existence provided).
Combining (6) and (7) leads to a quadratic expression for ˆ c:
ˆ c = b − 1/2+y ±
p
(b − 1/2+y)2 − 2y (8)
where we set:
y := (b − a)d.
In the Appendix we demonstrate that with uniform distributions as speciﬁed
above, equation (8) will have at most one solution (i.e., existing equilibria
12If c were uniformly distributed over [γ1,γ2],d e ﬁne ˜ c := (c − γ1)/(γ2 − γ1) which will
be uniform on [0,1].T h e nl e th undergo the same shift; this would not aﬀect uniformity
of its distribution. Proceed as below and afterwards re-transform the variables.
10are unique) whenever b ≥ 1, i.e., if consumers’ maximum willingness to
pay for sect membership exceeds what the most demanding sect would at
most charge for sect membership. Consider, however, the following numerical
speciﬁcation where b<1:
d =0 .2,a =0 .5, and b =0 .9.
Then (8) has two solutions:
ˆ c
+ =0 .7453 and ˆ c
− =0 .2147
with corresponding values for ˆ h of
ˆ h
+ =0 .8727 and ˆ h
− =0 .6073.
The ﬁrst equilibrium is of the secular type: Only a small fraction of the
population (less than seven percent) are a member of a sect, but pays a high
price for that (and active sect leaders’ charisma levels are high); the second
equilibrium is of the sectarian type with a large number of sects of rather
low average charisma, a large share of the population (almost three quarters)
being enrolled in sects, and relatively low average costs.
Proposition 1 Even if the distributions of charisma across sect leaders and
of consumer types are both uniform, multiple equilibria might arise in reli-
gious markets.
The observation that even with uniform type distributions equilibria in
religious markets are not necessarily unique13 is in contrast to results ob-
tained for standard lemons-type problems. E.g., Rose (1993) has shown by
numerical analyses that equilibria in lemons markets are always unique when
type distributions are uniform.14 Interestingly, our setting allows for the pos-
sibility of multiple equilibria even in the uniform case. The main feature that
distinguishes our setting from the standard adverse-selection problem is that
consumers pay for their purchases (here: sect membership) after uncertainty
has been lifted and not, as in the lemons market, before the quality of the
goods they purchase becomes known to them.
13Since (8) is a quadratic equation, uniform distributions can naturally not give rise to
more than two equilibria. However, with other distributions there is nothing to prevent
(3) and (4) to possess more than two solutions.
14Ar e l a t e dﬁnding is made by Gal-Or (1983) for an oligopoly model where both price
and quality levels are determined at an equilibrium: The equilibrium will be unique when
the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay is uniform. Otherwise, multiple
equilibria can arise.
11From an interpretative view the presence of two equilibria with the same
underlying distribution of population suggests that diﬀerent equilibria in the
religious market need not reﬂect fundamental diﬀerences in populations, but
may simply result from diﬀerent contingencies. The structure of the market
of religions does not necessarily bear a one-to-one relation to the distribution
of religious traits, spiritual desires, or social needs in a population.
Moreover, recall that the fewer people actually join sects, the higher are
expected membership costs imposed on those who join:15 The more secular
a society the more demanding are those few sects that are actually active
— and the more easily can these sects be regarded as exploiting or abusing
their members. This observation might explain why attitudes towards sects
are less lenient in “secular” countries than societies where larger parts of the
population are religiously aﬃliated.
Finally, observe an interesting feature of equilibria obtained in the uni-
form case above for b<1. All sect leaders with higher charisma c>ˆ c will
be active, in particular sect leaders with c>b .T h e i rﬂock will, however, en-
tirely consist of disappointed members whose willingness to pay h falls short
of membership cost c. Ex ante, however, these members joined in these sects
voluntarily, engaging in a gamble with expected positive payoﬀ. Hence, ﬁnd-
ing oneself trapped in a sect might be the unwarranted consequence of a
rational gamble. Those not believing that human beings choose faith or sect
aﬃliations in a rational way, may see members of high-demanding (“abu-
sive”) sects as victims who ought to be protected by the state. Diﬀerent
views on individual rationality translate into diﬀerent policy stands: Amer-
ican policy of laissez-faire is more consistent with the assumption of full
rationality, while more interventionist European policy would draw support
from imperfect rationality.
4W e l f a r e R e s u l t s
While establishing welfare comparisons between various equilibria is, in gen-
eral, a demanding task, our model allows for a simple and clear-cut ranking
of equilibria in the religious market:
Proposition 2 When there are multiple equilibria, they can be ranked so
that the more active sects there are in an equilibrium, the higher are con-
sumer surplus and producer surplus, and the lower is the average price of
sect membership.
15Formally, this follows from the fact hat both the loci α =0and β =0are upward-
sloped and that expected membership cost increase in charismatic requirements; see (5).
12The proof of this result is in the Appendix.
As both consumer surplus and producer surplus are larger with more
sects, so is social welfare. Our ﬁnding suggests that currently active sect
leaders could beneﬁt from increased competition by new entrants. As in-
creased competition by less charismatic sect leaders results in lower average
membership costs, it encourages entry by potential members staying initially
outside the market.
Furthermore, we ﬁn dt h a te n t r yb yl e s se ﬀective sect leaders requires an
increase in average sect size (1 − F(b c))/(1 − G(b h)),t h u sb o o s t i n gp r o ﬁts of
more eﬀective sect leaders. Market-creating eﬀe c t ,i . e . ,t h ei n c r e a s ei no v e r a l l
religious participation 1 − G(b h) would then override market-stealing eﬀect,
triggered by the increase in the number of suppliers 1 − F(b c).
For the so-called lemons problem, Wilson (1979, 1980) ﬁnds that higher-
price equilibria are Pareto-better than lower price equilibria. Interpreting,
in our framework, prices as expected membership costs, Proposition 2 seems
to be markedly at odds with Wilson’s result. However, the sects problem is
qualitatively diﬀerent from the standard lemons problem àl aAkerlof (1970)
or Wilson (1979). In a lemons market, price is handed over from buyer to
seller before the buyer observes the quality of what he purchases. A higher
price therefore always reﬂects that consumers expect the quality of the traded
good to be higher. In particular, as an equilibrium price equals the marginal
buyer’s willingness-to-pay for the expected level of quality, total expected
consumer surplus does not decline at higher prices. Sellers naturally prefer
higher prices which then explains why high-price equilibria Pareto dominate
low-price equilibria. In our setting, charismatic qualities only determine the
extent to which sect leaders can ex post exploit sect members, and charisma
does not positively enter consumers’ utility functions. Unlike in the lemons
problem, lower average quality — and, thus, expected membership costs and
a larger number of sects — is welcomed by consumers (individual and total
expected consumer surplus increase) and by sect leaders (the incumbents
beneﬁt from increased sect sizes and the new entrants would otherwise stay
out of the market).
An important caveat of our welfare results is that they refer to ordinary
and rather mainstream sects that charge a membership fee as an ex-post
compensation for providing religious services. In an ampliﬁed manner, the
same mechanism can also be exploited by destructive religious sects and even
terrorist groups. At worst, such groups end up promoting violence against
other people or suicide of its members (think, e.g., of Hamas, Aum Shinri
Kyo, or the Davidian Branch). Berman (2003) explains the emergence of
radical religious militias along these lines.
135 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we make several contributions to the economic theory of re-
ligion: First, we oﬀer a rational choice explanation for the puzzlingly large
diﬀerences in religious market structure sa n dm e m b e r s h i pa c r o s st h eU n i t e d
States or between the United States and most European countries. By show-
ing that religious markets are typically characterized by indeterminacy, we
complement (and partly challenge) the so-called supply-side theory of reli-
gious markets according to which diﬀerent patterns of religious activities in
diﬀerent countries are mainly the consequence of diﬀerent supplies in the
religious market. Our observation that a single set of initial (demand and
supply) conditions can give rise to a multitude of equilibrium outcomes with
high or low rates of religious participation, larger or smaller sects, and higher
or lower average costs of sect membership lends to a further explanation for
observed diversity in religious patterns: that of a mere eventuality or contin-
gency.
Second, we enrich the theory of religious markets by considering free en-
try decisions of potential religious leaders. So far, the supply side in religious
market (the set of active religious entrepreneurs) has always been assumed
to be parametrically ﬁxed. For example, in a recent contribution, Barros and
Garoupa (2002) study the interaction in the religious market with an incum-
bent (even, monopoly) church. While their focus is on how an existing church
locates in a policy space, we endogenize entry into the religious market. We
are not aware of any previous literature taking this step, which we view to
be crucial in understanding the religious market in the United States and
other countries without state-endowed monopoly churches. An interesting
topic for further research would be to combine the spatial-location model by
Barros and Garoupa (2002) with our model of endogenous entry.
Third, we demonstrate that membership in an “abusive” and exploiting
sect need not be an irrational act. Wishing never to have entered a certain
sect can just be the undesired consequence of an ex-ante perfectly rational
gamble, which questions certain interventionist policy recommendations ask-
ing for state regulation. There are, however, certain steps that a government
could take to curb the excesses of abusive sect leaders without infringing re-
ligious freedom. A somewhat controversial policy tool would be to limit the
tax deductibility of contributions towards religious groups, or even render-
ing religious groups tax liable, if the income they collect exceeds a certain
threshold per member. While many religious groups might denounce such
a change, curbing the possibility of more charismatic sect leaders to extract
contributions from their ﬂock could even invigorate the religious market. By
lowering expected membership costs, taxing excessive proﬁts by sect leaders
14could lead more people to join a sect, thereby ending up encouraging entry to
religious market by less charismatic and monetarily less demanding potential
sect leaders.
Our fourth contribution consists of welfare analysis. We establish general
conditions under which an equilibrium with a larger number of sects results
in higher aggregate consumer and producer surpluses. We even ﬁnd that a
move to an equilibrium with a larger share of potential sect leaders entering
the religious market is accompanied by an increase in average sect size and
in proﬁts made by initially active sect leaders. Market-creating eﬀects of
sectarian competition exceed market-stealing eﬀects.
Fifth, we tentatively relate our ﬁndings to the emergence of political atti-
tudes concerning the necessity of policing religious markets. We demonstrate
that in more secular societies (like the European ones) sects impose, on aver-
age, heavier burdens on their members than in societies with higher rates of
religious participation (like the United States). Fears that sect leaders might
(abusively) extract signiﬁcant resources and control the private lives of their
members would then appear, on average, more justiﬁed in a secular than in a
sectarian equilibrium. Diﬀerences in American and European perception of
sects might, therefore, need not reﬂect diﬀerences in underlying preferences
or market basics, but may already arise from living in societies with diﬀerent
equilibria.
Appendix
Uniqueness of equilibrium for uniform distributions if
b ≥ 1.
Recall (8), the equilibrium condition for ˆ c:
ˆ c = z + y ±
p
(z + y)2 − 2y
where we set:
z := b − 1/2 and y := (b − a)d.
Denote by ˆ c+ and ˆ c− the solutions to ˆ c when, respectively, the plus- and the
minus-sign are applied in (8). By b ≥ 1, z ≥ 0.5. There are two cases to be
distinguished:
15Case 1: z>1/2. Calculate that:
ˆ c
+ = z + y +
p
(z + y)2 − 2y>z+ y +
p
(z − y)2
= z + y + |z − y|
=
½
2z if z ≥ y
2y if y ≥ z
≥ 2z>1
which contradicts the restriction that ˆ c is bounded from above by 1. Hence,
equilibrium can (at most) occur at ˆ c−.
Case 2: z =1 /2. In this case, (z +y)2−2y =( 1
2 −y)2,a n db =1 .W ec a n










Now ˆ c+ =1and ˆ c− =2 y, the latter being strictly between 0 and
1. In the former case, we get ˆ h =1 , implying that nobody joins
the sect. Hence, an equilibrium can at most occur with ˆ c− =2 y.
Such an equilibrium will exist if the attending value of ˆ h,n a m e l yˆ h =
1/2+( 1− a)d does not exceed 1.
(ii) y = 1
2: Then, ˆ c− =ˆ c+ =1and ˆ h =1— which cannot be an equilibrium










Now ˆ c+ =2 y, violating the constraint that ˆ c ≤ 1.W e a r e l e f t w i t h
ˆ c− =1 , which cannot be an equilibrium as ˆ h>1 then. Hence, again
no equilibrium exists in this case.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider two alternative equilibria, called ϕ1 and ϕ2, such that the number of
sects is larger in ϕ2: ˆ c1 > ˆ c2. Notice from (2) that the expected membership
cost is decreasing in the number of active sect leaders: C(ˆ c2) <C (ˆ c1).T h u s ,
individuals who are sect members in ϕ1 can receive services by sects at a lower
price in ϕ2. These individuals will therefore be sect members in ϕ2,t o o ,a n d
will enjoy a higher consumer surplus then. Moreover, overall participation
16will be higher in ϕ2 than in ϕ1: b h2 < b h1. The additional sect members
receive non-negative expected surplus in ϕ2,c o m p a r e dt oz e r oi nϕ1. Hence,
consumer surplus is higher in ϕ2 than in ϕ1.
When b c decreases, equality in (4) can only be maintained if average sect
size (1 − F(ˆ c))/(1 − G(ˆ h)) increases. Producer surplus of those sects active
in ϕ1 is then larger in ϕ2, as they receive the same tithe per member from
a larger group of members. Additional sects in ϕ2 only enter if they earn
non-negative proﬁts, implying that producer surplus in ϕ2 is larger than in
ϕ1.Q E D
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